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The “Heckman critique” of field experiments 
on labor market discrimination calls into ques-
tion evidence from past studies, which generally 
point to discrimination in hiring. We use data 
on hiring of younger and older men from a new 
large-scale field experiment to assess this cri-
tique in the context of age discrimination. We 
find that correcting for the source of bias that 
this critique identifies can lead to different con-
clusions, in some cases eliminating evidence of 
age discrimination.
I. Evidence on Age Discrimination
Experimental audit or correspondence (AC) 
studies can provide compelling evidence on dis-
crimination in hiring decisions. Both types of 
studies use fictitious job applicants. Audit stud-
ies use in-person applicants leading to actual job 
offers. Correspondence studies create paper or 
electronic applicants, and capture “callbacks” 
for job interviews, avoiding experimenter effects 
and making feasible the collection of very large 
samples.
Existing field experiments on age almost 
always find substantial age discrimination in 
hiring. For example, Bendick, Jackson, and 
Romero (1997) find that in 43 percent of pairs 
only younger applicants (age 32) received pos-
itive responses, versus 16.5 percent for older 
applicants (age 57)—a “net discrimination” 
estimate of 26.5 percent.
Heckman (1998) argues, however, that differ-
ences in the variances of unobservables, which 
the study design cannot eliminate, can create 
biases in either direction. This problem could 
be important in studying age discrimination. In 
the model of human capital investment, earnings 
become more dispersed as workers age, as dif-
ferences in unobserved investment accumulate, 
which could generate a larger variance of unob-
servables for older versus younger applicants.
To assess such bias in the context of age dis-
crimination, we analyze data from a new, large-
scale field experiment. The study design lets us 
use a method developed in Neumark (2012) to 
identify the effect of age discrimination when 
the variance of unobservables can differ between 
groups.
II. Addressing the Heckman Critique
We explain the analysis of data from AC stud-
ies, the Heckman critique, and how to address 
it. Assume that productivity depends linearly 
and additively on two characteristics: a measure 
X I included on the resumes and standardized 
at  X I* across applicants in the study; and  X II , 
which is unobserved by firms. Let S denote 
older (“senior”) applicants and Y denote 
younger applicants. Define γ as an additional 
linear, additive term that reflects taste discrim-
ination (undervaluation of productivity) or 
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statistical discrimination  (an assumption that 
E ( X S II ) ≠ E ( X Y II ) ) regarding older workers—both 
of which are illegal in the United States.
With the data from an AC study, we estimate 
γ from a model for callbacks as a linear function 
of  X I and an indicator for age. Suppose a call-
back results if a worker’s perceived productiv-
ity exceeds a threshold c (>0). Then the hiring 
rules for older and younger applicants are
(1) T  ( X I* ,  X S II ) | (S = 1)  =  1   if  β I  X I*  +   X S II + γ  >  c
(1′) T  ( X I* ,  X Y II ) | (S = 0)  =  1 if  β I  X I*  +   X Y II   >  c,
where  X S 
II or  X Y 
II are the residuals.
If  X S 
II and  X Y 
II are normally distributed, with 
zero means, standard deviations  σ S II and  σ Y II, and 
distribution function Φ, the callback probabili-
ties are
(2) S = 1: Φ [( β I  X I* + γ − c)/ σ S II ] 
(2′ ) S = 0: Φ [( β I  X I* − c)/ σ Y II ] .
Without a restriction on  σ S II and  σ Y II, γ is 
unidentified—the basis of Heckman’s critique. 
For example, if  X I* is standardized at a low 
level, then  β I  X I* < c, and  σ S II >  σ Y II implies 
that we can find Φ [( β I  X I* + γ − c)/ σ S II ] 
> Φ [( β I  X I* − c)/ σ Y II ] even when γ = 0, that 
is, spurious evidence of discrimination in favor 
of older workers. This example shows that the 
relative variances of the unobservables interact 
with the level of quality chosen for the resumes 
in a correspondence study. Thus, without 
knowing how resume quality compares to those 
that employers receive, we cannot sign the bias 
even if we know whether  σ S II is greater or less 
than  σ Y II. Note also that the relative variances 
of the unobservables only matter as an artifact 
of the AC study design using resumes from a 
narrow “slice” of the distribution of applicants 
(by making them virtually identical).
Neumark (2012) shows that when the 
resumes in a correspondence study include 
skills that shift hiring for some applicants, γ 
can be  identified. The intuition is that a higher 
variance for one group implies a smaller effect 
of observed characteristics on the probability 
that applicants from that group meet the hiring 
standard. Thus, information on how variation in 
observable qualifications is related to employ-
ment outcomes can be informative about the 
relative variance of the unobservables, and this, 
in turn, can identify the effect of discrimination. 
The typical AC study does not include such 
characteristics because applicants are designed 
to be homogeneous. But if the applicants are 
made heterogeneous, this method can be used.
The critical assumption to identify the ratio of 
variances of the unobservables, and hence γ, is 
that  β I is equal for young and old applicants in 
the latent variable model for hiring. When there 
are data on many skills (like we build into this 
study design) there is an overidentifying restric-
tion that the ratios of coefficients on skills of 
older and younger applicants are equal (to the 
inverse of the ratio of the standard deviations of 
the unobservable). The parameters of the model, 
including γ, can be estimated using a heterosce-
dastic probit model.
III. The Field Experiment
The standard procedures for correspondence 
studies include: creation of data on artificial 
job applicants; applying for jobs; collection of 
data on hiring-related outcomes; and statistical 
analysis. The statistical analysis without quality 
variation in resumes is straightforward, and the 
extension to consider the Heckman critique fol-
lows the previous section.
As described in Neumark, Burn, and Button 
(2015), we grounded the creation of resumes as 
much as possible in empirical evidence on actual 
resumes posted by job seekers. We created 
job applicants aged 29–31, 49–51, and 64–66. 
Hiring of 64–66-year-olds is significant because 
policymakers are trying to induce working lon-
ger via Social Security reforms, and this is likely 
to require hiring in new jobs as older workers 
leave their main jobs for other jobs, for health or 
other reasons, before retiring. We report results 
only for the oldest versus the youngest male 
applicants, who applied for three types of jobs: 
retail sales, janitors, and security guards.
To explore the implications for the Heckman 
critique, we generated applicants of different 
skill levels for each job for which we apply.1 
1 Neumark, Burn, and Button (2015) report results for 
male and female applicants (with some females applying to 
different jobs), and provide a more extensive discussion of 
the experimental design, as well as discussion of how we 
use the data to explore a number of other issues relevant 
to field experiments on age discrimination, including the 
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We chose quality- or skill-related items based on 
extensive reading of actual resumes. High-skill 
resumes can include a post-secondary degree 
(B.A. for sales and security guard applicants, and 
Associate of Arts for janitor applicants), while all 
low-skill resumes only list a high school diploma. 
High-skill resumes can also include computer 
skills of some kind (appropriate to the job), flu-
ency in Spanish as a second language, and other 
occupation-specific skills, such as licensing and 
CPR for security jobs, and certification for jan-
itor jobs. The skills section can include one of 
three volunteer activities (food bank, homeless 
shelter, or animal shelter). All low-skill resumes 
include two typos, and some high-skill resumes 
do not. Finally, some high-skill resumes include 
recent “employee of the month” awards. We ran-
domly assign five of seven possible skill indica-
tors to each high-skill resume.
We assign all applicants to the same employer 
as either high skilled or low skilled, with 50 per-
cent probability for each, so that random assign-
ment of high-skill or low-skill resumes within a 
triplet does not dominate the effect of age. Other 
resume characteristics that are not supposed to 
affect hiring are randomized across resumes, as 
in other audit and correspondence studies.
Using a common job-posting website, over 
a period of approximately six months we sent 
out about 7,000 applications for male applicants 
aged either 29–31 or 64–66. Data on responses 
were collected by either e-mail or phone (voice-
mail responses).
IV. Results
Table 1 reports callback rates and statistical 
tests of independence. In retail, the callback rate 
for older applicants was significantly lower—
14.7 percent versus 20.9 percent for young 
applicants ( p = 0.00). For security jobs, call-
back rates were lower for older applicants—21.7 
versus 24.3 percent—with a marginally signifi-
cant difference ( p = 0.12). There were far fewer 
ads for janitor jobs. The callback rate differen-
tial is similar to security, but the difference is not 
statistically significant.2
 puzzle of how to standardize experience of young and old 
job applicants. 
2 One issue we explore in the larger study is whether using 
resumes for older applicants with low experience equal to 
that of younger applicants generates a bias toward finding 
The evidence of age discrimination in hiring 
based on the raw data is not as strong as in past 
studies. However, these conclusions can be mis-
leading because of the problem of differences in 
variances of the unobservables—our main focus 
to which we turn next.
Table 2 reports estimates of models that 
include a dummy variable for older applicants, 
control variables including the skill indica-
tors, and interactions between the skills and 
the old indicator. The interactions are informa-
tive because, under the identifying assumption 
that the underlying coefficients for the two age 
groups are equal, differences between the probit 
coefficients by age are informative about differ-
ences in the variances of the unobservables. For 
example, if the unobserved variance is larger for 
older workers, then, if the main effect of the skill 
variable is positive, the estimated interaction 
should be negative and reduce the overall effect 
toward zero.
For sales workers, the skill variables are rela-
tively unsuccessful in predicting hiring. The only 
main effect with a t-statistic exceeding one is 
employee of the month, for which the estimated 
age discrimination. For janitors, we found that it does, and 
hence in this paper only use the high (commensurate) expe-
rience resumes for older janitor applicants, to focus solely on 
bias from different variances of the unobservables. 





Sales (N = 3,570)
Callback (%) No 79.11 85.30
Yes 20.89 14.70
Test of independence ( p-value) 0.00
Security (N = 2,746)
Callback (%) No 75.72 78.26
Yes 24.28 21.74
Test of independence ( p-value) 0.12
Janitors (N = 845)
Callback (%) No 67.92 70.38
Yes 32.08 29.62
Test of independence ( p-value) 0.48
Notes: The p-values reported for the tests of independence 
are from Fisher’s exact test (two-sided). For the janitor 
resumes, only older resumes with commensurate experience 
are used.
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interaction is of the opposite sign and points to a 
diminished effect for older applicants, although 
there are also estimates  pointing to a larger effect 
for older applicants (e.g., computer skills). Thus, 
for sales workers, it is not clear how the estimate 
will change from accounting for differences in 
the variances of the unobservables.
For security workers, Spanish strongly pre-
dicts hiring, although the interaction suggests 
the effect is larger for older applicants, con-
sistent with a lower variance of the unobserv-
able for older workers. For some other skills 
the estimates point to positive effects for the 
young applicants but effects closer to zero for 
the old applicants, consistent with a larger vari-
ance of the unobservable for the older work-
ers, larger variance of the unobservable for 
older workers.
Similarly, for janitors, college strongly pre-
dicts hiring, the interaction is negative, and the 
combined effect is closer to zero. The same is 
true of technical skills. These estimates are con-
sistent with a larger variance of the unobserv-
able for older applicants.
Table 3 turns to the heteroscedastic pro-
bit estimates that correct for bias from differ-
ences in the variances of unobservables. Panel 
A reports the marginal effects from the stan-
dard probit model for each specification and 
sample. These estimates show significant evi-
dence of age discrimination only in sales jobs, 
although all of the point estimates are in this 
direction.
The first row of panel B reports the overall 
effect from the heteroscedastic probit estimates, 
which are similar to the probit estimates. Next, 
we report the p-values from the overidentifica-
tion test that the ratios of the skill coefficients 
between younger and older workers are equal 
across all of the skills. These p-values are uni-
formly high, indicating that we never reject the 
overidentifying restrictions.
We next report the ratio of the standard devi-
ation of the unobservables for old relative to 
young applicants. For sales applicants, the esti-
mated ratio of standard deviations is a bit below 
one (0.84)—in contrast to our conjecture, lower 
for older workers. The p-value for the test that 
the ratio equals one is above 0.1 (0.23), but still 
relatively low.
The last two rows of the table decompose the 
heteroscedastic probit estimates. “Old-level” is 
the unbiased estimate of the effect of age. The 
estimated level effect is near zero (−0.005), 
and nearly all of the effect comes from the vari-
ance (“Old-variance”)—interpreted as spurious 
 evidence from the research design—although 
Table 2—Probit Estimates for Callbacks by Age, Old 
versus Young, Effects of Skills and Interactions of 











































































































Observations 3,570 2,746 845
Notes: Marginal effects computed as the discrete change 
in the probability associated with the variables, evaluat-
ing other variables at their means. Standard errors are com-
puted based on clustering at the resume level. Other controls 
include city, order of resume submission, and employed/
unemployed. All controls are interacted with “Old” so main 
effect of “Old” is not meaningful. See notes to Table 1.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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these estimates are imprecise. Note also that 
the lower variance for older male sales appli-
cants would predict that the standard probit 
estimates would overstate discrimination if the 
resumes were on average low quality, which 
is what we find. Indeed in this case the cor-
rected estimate is most consistent with no age 
discrimination.
For security applicants, the ratio of stan-
dard deviations of the unobservables (1.16) 
points to a higher variance for older applicants. 
This leads, in the decomposition, to some-
what stronger evidence of age discrimination 
against older security workers (a marginal 
effect of −0.058, significant at the 10-percent 
level).
For janitor jobs, the estimated ratio of the 
standard deviation of the observable is above 
one by relatively more (1.33), although with the 
small sample not significantly different from 
one. In the decomposition, the point estimate of 
the unbiased effect of discrimination is larger 
(−0.084 versus −0.031), but given the large 
standard error, is not statistically significant. For 
both security and janitor jobs, the higher vari-
ance of the unobservable for older applicants 
coupled with an increased estimate of discrimi-
nation from the heteroscedastic probit estimates 
is consistent with lower quality resumes (as 
for sales), which in these cases biases down-
ward (i.e., toward zero) the estimate of age 
discrimination.
V. Conclusions
Our evidence points to more ambiguous evi-
dence of age discrimination against older men 
than past research. For the three occupations we 
study—retail, security, and janitors—the point 
estimates always indicate age discrimination; 
but the standard evidence is only strongly sig-
nificant for retail.
Moreover, the analysis indicates that conclu-
sions are sensitive to accounting for the Heckman 
critique, adding to the ambiguity. The strongest 
evidence of age discrimination—in retail sales—
disappears completely once the estimate is cor-
rected for the bias identified by this critique. For 
security and janitor jobs, in contrast, the evidence 
of discrimination strengthens, although it is sig-
nificant—and only weakly—just for security 
jobs.
The more demanding analysis of the data 
results, quite naturally, in less precise estimates. 
Nonetheless, the sensitivity of the conclusions 
demonstrates the need to design experimental 
studies of labor market discrimination to have 
the capacity to correct for biases from differ-
ences in the variances of unobservables across 
the groups studied.
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